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THE GAIT AGREEMENT ON GOVERNMENT 
PROCUREMENT IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
Charles Tiefer* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Uruguay Round GATT Agreement on Government Pro-
curement (AGP), which became effective January 1, 1997, appeared 
at first glance to end the preference barriers against foreign suppli-
ers in procurement by American state and local governments. l Such 
preference barriers are widespread.2 The United States' main inter-
national trading partners objected to these trade barriers in the 
Uruguay Round of GATT trade negotiations. They refused to open 
up protected procurement sectors of their own, while the American 
state government procurement sector remained discriminatory to-
ward them. To bring the Uruguay Round to fruition, American 
negotiators had to, and did, match foreign concessions with the 
AGP's bar against in-state procurement preferences. In implement-
ing the AGP, Congress had to, and did, approve this. 
Accordingly, as described in this Article's next section, the AGP 
does extend GATT's principle of "non-discrimination» against for-
eign enterprise to the sector of state and local procurement. How-
ever, as the section further discusses, a closer look at the com-
promises made in the AGP negotiation and implementation 
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1. The Agreement on Government Procurement is reprinted with other useful 
documents in NATIONAL AssocIATION OF STATE PROCUREMENT OmCERS, WORlD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION GoVERNMENT PROCUREMENT AGREEMENT: IMPLEMENTATION 
GUIDEUNES AND DIRECTORY OF SoUCITATION ADVERTISING 40-68 (1996) [herein-
after NASPO]. 
2. See James D. Southwick, Binding the States: A Survey of State Law Conformance 
with the Standards of the GAIT Procurement Code, 13 U. PA J. INT'L Bus. L. 57 
(1992). 
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processes at least begins raising questions about just how strongly 
the AGP acts. 
As discussed in the Article's third section, the AGP explicitly 
limits its own scope of coverage: it only applies to thirty-seven states, 
and even to those, does not reach excepted sectors; moreover, the 
AGP creates ambiguity in implementation because it does not 
render in-state preferences invalid on their face or as applied to 
out-of-state domestic suppliers, only purporting to except selected 
foreign suppliers from their application. Most important, Congress's 
implementation of the AGP limits the remedying of state preferen-
tial decisions in major, if unobvious, ways. Congress has precluded, 
in the GATT implementation act, any private federal judicial rem-
edy under the AGP. 
Thus, procedurally, the AGP offers the foreign supplier consid-
erably less than a smooth procedural route to American state con-
tracts. Free-trade supporters may naturally view this as pure ba~ 
news. I will argue in the Article's fourth section that the AGP's rem-
edy limitations serve valuable political purposes. In domestic terms, 
those limitations maintain the political flexibility inherent in the 
dual sovereignty system of American federalism. At the same time, 
in international terms, such unobvious limitations in the AGP's re-
medial implementation enable the United States to successfully 
move forward in trade negotiations. That is why the Article ends 
with an optimistic conclusion. 
II. PREFERENCES IN STATE PROCUREMENT, AND GATT'S 
AGP 
A. State Preferences 
For obvious reasons, state and local government procurement 
often favors domestic suppliers, through a patchwork of formal and 
informal preferences that work against foreign suppliers. Congress 
has led the way in having a formal national "Buy America" prefer-
ence in federal procurement,3 so, naturally, a number of the states 
have a similar one in their state procurement. 4 The Congressionally 
enacted "Buy America" preference primarily serves a national goal 
to reduce domestic unemployment. It is implemented in each par-
ticular procurement by the federal contracting officer adding to 
each foreign proposal a "Buy America" factor, typically a six percent 
3. See, e.g., William H. Lash III, Some ''Buy American" Ruks Ease: The 1933 Act De-
vised to Foster U.S. Industry Keeps Evolving, NAT'L L J., july 26, 1993, at 23. 
4. See Southwick, supra note 2, at 57. 
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differential. Additionally, that central "Buy America" preference, 
and certain other fonnal "Buy America" preferences like a fifty per-
cent differential for defense purchases, serve particular purposes in 
particular procurement sectors, such as the national security pur-
pose of building up our domestic defense supply industry. S 
The federal "Buy America" regulations embody provisions for 
exceptions for foreign suppliers whose countries have joined the 
United States in reciprocal efforts at free trade, generally referred 
to as "qualified" countries.6 These exception regulations are imple-
mented in each procurement by the contracting officer deciding 
whether a particular foreign supplier falls under an exception to 
the application of the differential and becomes a "BAA qualified" 
supplier.7 As a prime example, the federal government imple-
mented GAIT's AGP, negotiation of which is discussed below, at 
the level of federal procurement by regulatory exceptions for sup-
pliers in the GATT nations.8 
Those federal exception regulations teach an important lesson: 
it makes a difference how Congress implements international trade 
arrangements. Congress did not repeal the Buy America Act in 
favor of free trade. It did not even create some separate procedural 
system for implementing the GAIT AGP. Rather, Congress kept the 
Buy America Act in effect, with a system for accommodations to 
free trade agreements on a procurement-by-procurement basis.9 
This substantive and procedural arrangement for making exception 
decisions in individual procurements reflects how the balance of po-
litical forces in this context does not accord completely with either 
the vision of the purist free trade supporter, who might prefer an 
5. See David W. Burgett, Protectionism and Internationalization in Defense Procurement; 
The Section 800 Panel Recommendations on Defense Trade and Cooperation, 40 FED. 
B. NEWS & J. 448 (1993). 
6. See Bruce S. Ramo et aI., Free and open': Prefermces for Domestic Products in U.S. 
and International Public Procurements, CoNT. MGMT., June 1991, at 40. 
7. See id. 
8. See Martin J. Golub & Sandra Lee Fenske, U.S. Guvernment Procurement: opportu-
nities and Obstacles for Foreign Contractors, 20 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L & ECON. 567, 
575-77 (1987). 
9. When disputes occur as to whether contracting officers have given those ex-
ceptions proper effect, those disputes get resolved on an individual basis 
through the regular federal administrative and judicial system for resolving 
contractor procurement disputes. See, e.g., Charles W. Clanton, John C. Grimberg 
Co. v. United States: Has the Federal Cin:uit Eased the Restrictions of the Buy Ameri-
can Act', 15 N.C. J. INT'L L & CoM. REG. 115 (1990). 
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outright repeal of the Buy America Act, or that of domestic prefer-
ence supporters, who regret any incursion into the Buy America 
Act's operation. Rather, the system reflects Congress's delicate politi-
cal balance between a willingness to match foreign trade conces-
sions and a desire to continue favoring domestic employment. 
A second formal state rule has no matching federal counter-
part. Many of the states have formal in-state preferences, that favor 
the state's own suppliers over out-of-state ones, both domestic and 
foreign. Some particular state legislatures simply declare that the 
state's procurement officers should favor suppliers of that state. Al-
ternatively, some state legislatures specify particular differentials 
favoring suppliers within that state over outsiders. Often the prefer-
ence concerns particular sectors, like western states with in-state 
preferences for their own beef. Given the small fraction of com-
merce in America that comes from overseas, such in-state prefer-
ences presumably operate primarily against other domestic suppliers 
rather than foreign ones. 
States may also discriminate in favor of in-state suppliers by in-
formal means. It stands to reason that the same political factors 
leading to the many "Buy America" and in-state preferences en-
acted formally as state legislation1o also lead to informal preferences 
by state administrators. Like state legislators, the state governors and 
their administrations are accountable to their state's public and 
their state's particular interest groups. Just as the local political sup-
port for favoring local suppliers influences state legislators, it may 
influence state administrations. 
Both formal and informal in-state preferences can have two 
types of goals, just like the national "Buy America" goals: general 
favoring of state employment, and some particular interest regard-
ing a particular procurement sector. At the state level, the particular 
interest would not be national defense, of course, or relief of some 
special political concern regarding that particular sector, much like 
a subsidy program meant to draw or to retain particular business 
for that state. 
B. The Background of the AGP 
Behind the negotiation and approval of the Uruguay Round's 
AGP lies a significant political history. The original modem impetus 
to establish international trade agreements goes back to the post-
10. See Southwick, supra note 2, at 57. 
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Depression reaction against the history of high tariffs and their de-
structive effects on trade. ll As Congress evolved various mechanisms 
for domestic effectuation of GAIT trade agreements, it ultimately 
adopted the Trade Act of 1974,12 carried forward, with modifica-
tions, by the Trade Agreement Act of 197913 and by modifying and 
renewing legislation in 198414 and 1988.1S The 1974 Act created a 
system by which the President negotiates agreements always antici-
pating a need to obtain Congressional approval, and then submits 
implementing bills for the trade agreements to Congress. Congress, 
in turn, binds itself procedurally to move the implementing bills, in 
the form submitted by the President, along an internal "Fast Track" 
free both from floor amendments, and from excessive delays.16 This 
"Fast Track" mechanism has produced a series of legislative strug-
gles and legislative successes over the years, culminating in the 
1990s in the Clinton Administration's success in securing approval 
of implementing bills for two controversial agreements, the NAFTA 
and the GAIT Uruguay Round agreements.17 
C. Negotiation and Approval of the AGP 
Focusing on the particular subject of GAIT agreements regard-
ing government procurement, while the original GATT did not 
cover government procurement at all, in 1979, the Tokyo Round of 
GAIT negotiations produced a limited Agreement on Government 
Procurement.18 However, the 1979 agreement did not apply to pro-
curement by states and cities ("subfederal" entities). When Uruguay 
Round negotiations started in 1988,19 participating countries hoped 
to expand the 'coverage of the 1979 agreement. Their preliminary 
11. See john H. jackson, The General Agrument on Tariffs and Trade in United States 
Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L REv. 249 (1967). 
12. Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975); see alsojoHN H.jACKSON ET AL. LEGAL 
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIC RELATIONS 14142 (1995). 
13. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979); see also jackson et al., supra note 12, at 
14347. 
14. See Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (1984). 
15. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, . Pub. L No. 100418, 102 
Stat. 1107 (1988); see also Edmund W. Sim, Derailing the Fast Track for Interna-
tional Trade Agruments, 5 F1A J. INT'L L 471 (1992). 
16. 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2191-93 (West, WESTLAW through May 15, 1997). 
17. The NAITA Implementation Act is Pub. L. No. 103-182 (1994). 
18. See Golub & Feske, supra note 8, at 567. 
19. See JACKSON ET AL. supra note 12, at 147. 
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agreement envisaged a code drafted to apply to some sphere of cov-
erage of state and local procurement and government-owned enter-
prises, with the actual sphere of coverage to be set out 'for each sig-
natory country in schedules, or annexes, to the agreement that 
would be collectively negotiated but would be adapted to the situa-
tion . of each signatory. 
The United States did not set out in these negotiations to enter 
into an agreement that would apply uniformly and nationally to 
preempt in-state preferences in all fifty states.20 Until 1992, this part 
of the Uruguay Round talks21 had temporarily stalled. The lead in 
this matter was being taken by negotiations between the European 
Union and the United States on a bilateral agreement on govern-
ment procurement, akin to the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement 
approved in 1979. These bilateral talks had stalled over the question 
of the balance between the size of the sectors that the European 
Union and the United States were each offering to open (their 
"tenders").22 The United States objected that European govern-
ment-owned enterprises, like national telecommunications and util-
ity companies, were not open. Meanwhile, the Europeans com-
plained that more than half of U.S. states applied one form or 
another of "buy local" policies, as did thirteen out of the twenty-
four biggest U.S. cities.23 Ultimately, the United States was able to 
improve its offer to thirty-seven states to be bound by the AGP. 
For covered procurements, the fundamental principle which 
the AGP extended to state and local procurements was GATT's ba-
sic guarantee of "national treatment and non-discrimination. "24 
20. The United States waS able to offer in its negotiations that its annexes would 
list coverage of 24 states, meaning that 24 states had voluntarily agreed to let 
the federal government include them in coverage. See Steven S. Diamond & 
Rosemary Maxwell, opening the International Gavemment Marltetplace: New Devel-
opments on the NAFTA, U.S.-EC, and GAIT Fronts, BNA FEn. CONT. REp., July 25, 
1994, at n.82. 
21. See JACKSON ET AL. supra note 12, at 316-18 for an overview of the Uruguay 
Round. 
22. See Gerard De Graaf & Matthew King, Towanls a More GWbal Government Procuff!-
ment Market: The Expansion of the GAIT Gavemment Procumnent Agreement in the 
Context of the Uruguay Round, 29 INT'L L 435 (1995). 
23. See itl. at 442 & n.39; see also SERVlCES OF THE CoMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN 
CoMMUNITIES. REPoRT ON UNITED STATES 'TRADE BARRIERS AND UNFAIR PRACTICES 
1991: PROBLEMS OF DOING BUSINESS WITH THE U.S. 53-57 (1991) (listing state 
procurement preferences). 
24. JACKSON ET AL. supra note 12, at 436-63. 
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Under Article II, the parties must provide the products and suppli-
ers of other parties with treatment "no less favorable" than ac-
corded to domestic products and suppliers.2S Other articles of the 
AGP impose a variety of procedural obligations for government pro-
curement, frequently described as "transparency" requirements, to 
prevent discrimination and encourage foreign suppliers. When 
American enterprises seek to sell to foreign countries, these "trans-
parency" requirements may matter greatly. American enterprises 
have often declared themselves handicapped by the invisible ways 
some countries do their government procurement, such as Japan.26 
However, American state procurement already meets most of these 
"transparency" requirements, like advertisement of procurements 
and systems for bid protests.27 While the application of the AGP to 
state procedures is significant, for purposes of this Article attention 
may be directed to how the fundamental non-discrimination princi-
ple will be applied, and particularly to the procedures for, its 
effectuation. 
The Uruguay Round agreements, including the AGP, still had 
to receive Congressional approval in the form of adoption of an im-
plementing bill. In light of how the "Fast Track" works, both the 
President and Congress had engaged in intense joint consideration 
of the agreements even before they were finally concluded in April 
1994. Congress had started a series of committee hearings during' 
negotiations. The House Report on the Uruguay Round agreements 
summarizes the House hearings: 
Following the 12O-day advance notice to Congress on De-
cember 15, 1993, of the President's intent to enter into the 
agreements, the full Committee held a hearing on January 
26, 1994, followed by four days of comprehensive Subcom-
mittee hearings on February 1, 2, 8 and 22 to review the fi-
nal results of the Uruguay Round negotiations (Serial No. 
103-73). Finally, the full Committee held a hearing on June 
10, 1994 on the World Trade Organization and its implica-
tions for U.S. sovereignty.28 
25. See ill. at 44447 for a discussion of the implementation of the nondiscrimina-
tion principle in GAIT. 
26. see Jean Heilman Grier, U.S. Japan Government Procurement Agrenrumts, 14 WIS. 
Im'L L. J. 1 (1995). 
27. A guide has been prepared for states to follow. See NASPO, supra note l. 
28. H.R REP. No. 103-826, pt. 1, (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3791-92. 
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It was not until September 27, 1994, that the President trans-
mitted to Congress H.R 5220, the implementing bill for the Uru-
guay Round agreements.29 The President also submitted a "State-
ment of Administrative Action. "30 As further clarification, the 
United States Trade Representative provided a set of answers to 
questions from the National Association of State Procurement Of-
ficers (NASPO).31 Since Congress enacted, in December 1994, the 
implementing bill for the Uruguay Round agreements,32 including 
the AGP, the next section can appropriately tum to just what the 
agreements, and the implementation bill, put into effect. 
III. LIMITATIONS ON THE EFFECT OF THE AGP ON STATE 
PREFERENCES 
A. VISible Indications of Limits of the AGPs Effect 
In 1992, a survey of state government procurement legislation 
found that a majority of the states had "Buy America" or in-state 
preferences of one kind or another.33 Reviewing that survey in early 
1997, the negotiation and approval of the AGP appears not to have 
caused any significant number of states to repeal those preferences. 
Most of them remain on the books; the few changes may well have 
little or nothing to do with the AGP. 
While the in-state preferences that existed in 1992, and persist 
in 1997, depart from the ideal of free trade, many do not violate 
the AGP even arguably. Only thirty-seven states agreed to coverage 
at all by the AGP, and are listed in the United States' annex to the 
agreement. The other thirteen have a perfect right to disregard the 
AGP, and ten of them are simply availing themselves of this right by 
preserving their in-state preferences. Even of the thirty-seven, a 
mere twenty agreed to coverage of most or all of their executive 
29. See H.R REP. No. 103-826, pt. 2, (1994), -reprinted in 1994 V.S.C.C.A.N. 4013. 
30. Statement of Administrative Action, -reprinted in 1994 V.S.C.C.A.N. 4040. 
31. These answers are reprinted in AMERICAN BAR AssocIATION. SECfION OF PuBuc 
CONTRACT LAw. RIDING THE WAVE OF CHANGE IN STATE AND LoCAL PROCURE-
MENT (Feb. 10, 1995)(hereinafier VSTR ANSWERS), in the section at the end of 
Tab E. 
32. See JACKSON ET AL. supra note 12, at 326. 
33. See Southwick, supra note 2, at 57. 
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branch agencies.34 Seventeen only agreed to coverage of selected ex-
ecutive branch agencies, or excepted significant sectors.3S Those sev-
enteen included the large states of Illinois and Texas, and certain 
states that can have significant levels of political discontent about 
foreign imports, such as Michigan and New Hampshire. Where the 
"Buy America" or in-state preferences concern the agencies or sec-
tors excepted by those thirty-seven states, those preferences, even 
when applied at the expense of would-be foreign suppliers, in no 
way violate the AGP. 
Even those states which accepted coverage of sectors did not 
agree to leveling their in-state preferences as they apply to domestic 
out-of-state suppliers. States may strive for the minimum required 
compliance with the AGP. That is, they may choose to relieve for-
eign suppliers from the effect of the in-state preference, but not ac-
cord such relief to out-of-state domestic suppliers. A state that 
agreed to comply with the AGP, but wants to have an in-state pref-
erence, may treat foreign suppliers from GATT countries as relieved 
from the effect of the preference, while not according that relief to 
suppliers in other American states. 
This may seem quite an anomaly, like the days of the Articles 
of Confederation when the thirteen original states felt free to treat 
imports from each other harshly while welcoming trade with Eu-
rope. Yet, that this is legal has been repeatedly verified. During the 
sensitive period when the Congress had to decide whether to imple-
ment the AGP, the NASPO submitted a series of written questions 
to the United States Trade Representative. The following question 
and answer were exchanged on this subject: 
Q: Will Code implementation result in the potential for a 
foreign bidder to be treated more favorably than a domestic 
bidder not located in the entity conducting the 
procurement? 
34. The twenty states are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Vennont, Washington, and WIS-
consin. See Diamond & Maxwell, supra note 20, at n.86. 
35. The seventeen states are Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, lliinois, Iowa. 
Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming. See ill. For a state-by-
state list of covered agencies and exceptions see NASPO, supra note 1, at Ap-
pendix A 
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A; The Code says nothing about how domestic bidders are 
treated, as long as they are treated no more favorably than 
bidders from other signatories.36 
Accordingly, when the NASPO published a guide to AGP compli-
ance for the states, it declared: 
Discriminatory procurement laws can continue to be ap-
plied to procurements that do not fall within the terms of 
the agreement or to bidders not located in covered coun-
tries. The procurement official must determine that the 
product or service does not actually originate in a covered 
country, or the parent firm of the bidder is not located in a 
covered country.37 
In other words, a state can decide to retain an in-state prefer-
ence, denying contracts to firms in other American states while al-
lowing them to foreign firms, a true program for exporting jobs. 
The situation follows directly from the political logic of the AGP. 
The United States trade negotiators did not purport to assert or 
employ the power to preempt state laws to create a better domestic 
economy, only to solicit state cooperation in order to secure match-
ing foreign concessions. States that choose to lower their in-state 
preferences only as needed to secure foreign reciprocal concessions, 
have done as much as the federal government asked. 
However, there is a key procedural consequence for the fact 
that even the thirty-seven covered states remain free to have formal 
"Buy America" and in-state preferences. So long as states can retain 
their old formal preferences on their books and even adopt new 
ones, it becomes critical just what procedural remedies exist to 
check what procurement officers do on particular procurements. 
Moreover, informal preferences may persist, namely, administrative 
favoritism toward American suppliers even without an explicit state 
legislative in-state or "Buy America" preference. These two catego-
ries make it critical just what procedural remedies will apply in cases 
of discrimination against GATT signatory suppliers. 
36. USTR ANSWERS, supra note 31, at 1. Having answered the question that the 
AGP does not require any reduction in in-state preferences applied against 
out-of-state domestic bidders, the answer adds, "The Administration has 
pledged in its Statement of Administrative Action, which accompanies the im-
plementing legislation, to encourage all covered states to offer non-
discriminatory treatment to suppliers from other covered states." [d. 
37. NASPO, supra note 1, at 5. 
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B. Limits on the GAIT Panel Remedy 
The Uruguay Round agreements strengthened the eXlstmg 
public international law remedy for violations: panels. In brief, a 
GATT signatory nation which considers an American state practice 
to violate the AGP can file a complaint, which will be referred to a 
panel. The panel receives written and oral submissions from the 
other nation and from the United States Trade Representative. 
While the American state, as a "subfederal entity," does not for-
mally participate as a party, the implementation bill provides for the 
Trade Representative to consult and involve the state.38 The Admin-
istration submitted a statement elaborating in detail on the requisite 
consultation.39 If the panel concludes that the American state's prac-
tice violates the AGP, still, as the House report on the implement-
ing bill explains: 
The Uruguay Round Agreements do not automatically 
"preempt" or invalidate state laws that do not conform to 
the rules set out in those agreements - even if a dispute 
settlement panel were to find a state measure inconsistent 
with such an agreement.40 
The implementation law provides that after such a panel ruling, 
"the Trade Representative shall consult with the State concerned in 
an effort to develop a mutually agreeable response to the report of 
the panel. "41 The Administration Statement, and legislative history, 
anticipate that an elaborate "cooperative approach" would be 
followed.42 
Section 102(b)(2) of the implementing bill does establish the 
authority for the United States Attorney General to file an action in 
federal court to declare a state law invalid as inconsistent with the 
Uruguay Round agreements.43 However, both the legislative history 
and the Administration Statement make clear that "[t]he authority 
conferred on the United States under this paragraph is intended to 
be used only as a 'last resort.' "44 Even if the Attorney General files 
38. See 19 U.S.CA §§ 3512 (b)(1)(C) (ii)-(iii) (West, WESTLAW through May 15, 
1997). 
39. See Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 30, at 13-14. 
40. H.R REP. No. 103-826, pt. 2, (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 4028. 
41. 19 U.S.CA § 3512(b)(1)(C)(iv) (West, WESTLAW through May 15, 1997). 
42. See H.R REP. No. 103-826, pt. 2, (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. at 4029. 
43. See 19 U.S.CA § 3512(b)(2)(8) (West, WESTLAW through May 15, 1997). 
44. H.R. REP. No. 103-826, pt. 2, (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. at 4029. 
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such a suit, the implementing law gives the state a fair chance, by 
explicitly denying binding effect, or even deference, to the panel 
ruling,45 and by assigning to the United States the burden of 
proof.46 As the legislative history and the Administration Statement 
explain: 
The United States would base any such proceeding on the 
provisions of the relevant Uruguay Round Agreement -
not a panel report - and the court would thus consider 
the matter de novo .... [T]he court would reach its own, 
independent interpretation of the relevant provisions [of 
the Agreement] .... 47 
Exciting as it is to contemplate an international panel decision 
followed by a United States suit against a state, it is not likely to oc-
cur often. As the United States Trade Representative said to the 
NASPO: 
Direct challenge of state procurement practices 
through formal dispute settlement proceedings are likely to 
be very rare. In the 13-year history of the Code, there have 
only been two challenges.48 
Only one panel ruling under the Tokyo Round AGP appears to 
have adjudicated the validity of a United States government action. 
That was a panel, initiated by the European Community, to chal-
lenge procurement by the National Science Foundation of a sonar 
mapping system in 1991, domestically, under a "Buy American" re-
quirement. The panel procedures do not seem to have been very 
inviting. 
Even if the strengthened panel procedures of the Uruguay 
Round proved more inviting than the old panel procedures,49 the 
practical problems for the foreign supplier considering its invoca-
tion loom large. The foreign supplier cannot use this remedy itself; 
the remedy belongs only to nations, not private entities. Hence, the 
supplier must persuade its national government to make a chal-
lenge. For many reasons including the potential for challenges to its 
own practices, a nation may not wish to pursue the claim. One can 
45. See 19 U.S.CA § 3512(b)(2)(B)(i) (West, WESTlAW through May 15, 1997). 
46. See 19 U.S.CA § 3512(b)(2)(B)(ii) (West, WESTlAW through May 15, 1997). 
47. H.R REP. No. 103-826, pt. 2, (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. at 4030. 
48. USTR ANSWERS, supra note 31, at 9. 
49. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along with Rights: Institutional Reform in the 
Nf!W GAIT, 88 AM. J. INr'L L 477 (1994). 
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readily imagine a period when for diplomatic reasons one nation, 
say France, might be eager to file challenges against the United 
States but Japan might not, yet the foreign suppliers who run into 
challengeable state barriers in California might well only be Japa-
nese, not French. 
Of course, a nation could decide to challenge state barriers 
even without any aggrieved suppliers, as part of its goal of clearing 
a path for its commercial interests. This might be more likely if the 
issues tended to be blatant, clear-cut state "nullification" legislation. 
However, as discussed above, the mere existence on the books of an 
in-state preference is not a blatant, clear-cut violation of the AGP, 
since the state can take the position that its procurement officers 
should, and will, only apply the preference to domestic out-of-state 
suppliers, not to GATT signatory suppliers. Hence, the most likely 
issues need not be blatant. They could be procurement-specific, 
such as when a state procurement officer applies an in-state prefer-
ence to a GATT signatory supplier. They could be even more fact-
specific, such as when a state procurement officer uses some pretex-
tual reason to reject a foreign supplier. Such procurement-specific, 
fact-specific situations lend themselves little to anticipatory chal-
lenges by foreign nations without actual aggrieved suppliers. 
c. Limits on Administrative and Judicial Remedies 
Assuming that the most promising challenges to state practices 
occur in procurement-specific, fact-specific situations, those familiar 
with how all current challenges to state procurements occur may 
well ask why the aggrieved foreign suppliers would not simply pro-
ceed with their own administrative and judicial actions. Mer all, if 
a Florida grower finds a California ordinance bars his oranges from 
sale in California, she does not currently ask the State of Florida to 
sue the State of California under the original jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court of the United States. If a New Jersey firm bids and 
loses on a New York state contract now on a basis it considers ille-
gal, it does not ask the State of New Jersey to file an action against 
the State of New York. The Florida grower files a federal suit under 
Commerce Clause principles to invalidate the California barrier. 
The New Jersey firm protests the contract award, starting in 
whatever administrative forum the New York procuring agency pro-
vides, then through New York judicial channels. Cannot aggrieved 
foreign suppliers do the same? 
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At the outset, it appears that Congress has closed the federal 
courthouse doors to such chaUenges. Section 102(c) of the imple-
mentation law bars private causes of action or defenses based on 
the Uruguay Round agreements.50 It precludes any private suit 
against any state on the ground that the state has taken a procure-
ment action inconsistent with the agreements.51 The act has cal-
culatedly made a suit by the United State the only kind of suit a 
federal court can entertain. 
The Administration and Congress thus deliberately took away 
from aggrieved foreign suppliers the Commerce Clause-based fed-
eral action against a state that discriminates, taking away what has 
historically been the most powerful tool in breaking down state dis-
crimination (in regulatory, not procurement contexts) against out-
of-state business. Together with the cumbersome nature of the 
panel remedy, this represents a deliberate decision to all but pre-
clude sweeping or aggressive foreign campaigns to break down in-
state preferences. So long as states do not go out spoiling for a 
fight with foreign countries, they can not only have in-state prefer-
ences on their legislative books, but they can choose in at least 
some of their procurements to disfavor foreign suppliers. At least, 
they need have very little fear of federal court actions as a result, 
and not overmuch concern about the rare foreign nation's direct 
challenge. 
That still leaves the aggrieved foreign supplier the same remedy 
as aggrieved domestic suppliers use against allegedly illegal state 
procurement actions: the state's own administrative and judicial 
remedies. The extent to which a foreign supplier can raise the AGP 
in a state forum poses one of the most interesting current ques-
tions. On the one hand, it can be argued that even a state forum is 
not to entertain the AGP issue. The Uruguay Round implementa-
tion law declares that there are no private causes of action, that no 
state law may be declared invalid as inconsistent with the AGP ex-
cept in an action brought by the United States.52 Congress and the 
President equally supported those limitations. Congress went out of 
its way to say in the implementation law its "intent" to preclude 
raising of the AGP: 
50. See 19 U.S.C. § 3511(c)(1)(A) (West, WESTLAW through May 15, 1997). 
51. See 19 U.S.C. § 3511(c)(1)(B) (West, WESTLAW through May 15, 1997). 
52. H.R REP. No. 103-826, pt. 2, (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4028. 
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INTENT OF CONGRESS-It is the intention of the Con-
gress through paragraph (1) to occupy the field with re-
spect to any cause of action or defense under or in connec-
tion with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, including 
by precluding any person other than the United States from 
bringing any action against any State or political subdivision 
thereof or raising any defense to the application of State 
law under or in connection with any of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements. . . .53 
45 
Nothing about this emphatically stated intent addresses solely ac-
tions in federal court; the words of text, and of Administrative in-
tent, and of legislative history alike apply equally to actions in state 
forums as well. As the Administration explained, keeping these is-
sues out of court involved conscious foreign affairs goals.54 Surely, 
Congress and the President together have the power, in negotiating 
and approving an international agreement, to keep it from being 
raised in any administrative or judicial forum, including state ones. 
On the other hand, an aggrieved foreign supplier already has 
whatever private cause of action the state law provides for a chal-
lenge, in an appropriate time and place, to the award of a contract 
to another bidder. The door of the state courthouse, in contrast to 
the federal one, is readily open to the aggrieved bidder, foreign 
and domestic alike, who claims that a state agency rejected its bid 
without legal authorization to do so. A challenged state agency will 
find it something of a challenge, when the state must defend its ac-
tion in court, to keep the AGP out of the discussion. Several times, 
state courts in pre-Uruguay Round days have proven quite willing to 
consider state laws "preempted" by GATT, even if a purist might 
wonder whether Congress had given any such effect. 55 
53. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c) (2). 
54. With respect to the states, section 102 represents a determination by the Con-
gress and the Administration that private lawsuits are not an appropriate 
means for ensuring state compliance with the Uruguay Round agreements. 
Suits of this nature may interfere with the President's conduct of trade and 
foreign relations and with suitable resolution of disagreement or disputes 
under those agreements. Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 30, ~ 
printed in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4055. 
55. Mter all, a state court hearing a foreign supplier's challenge would review an 
agency's decision ostensibly to apply an in-state legislative preference, or to re-
ject the foreign bid for some non-discriminatory reason. It will have before it 
a state assistant attorney general, or similar state executive lawyer, who will 
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Hence, the state forums seem neither obviously open, nor defi-
nitely closed. Those familiar with state adjudication of challenges on 
other grounds to contract awards might reach the same result by 
the shorter result that what happens in such challenges varies from 
state to state, and sometimes within a state as well. Still, even if the 
state court listens to invocation of the AGP, that does not ensure a 
major victory for the protester. The state court may entertain the 
challenge, but given its particular fact-specific nature and the defer-
ence owed to state contracting officers, the state court may reject 
the challenge on the merits. Even if it rules for the foreign supplier 
on the merits, it may decide to give a limited remedy; it may not or-
der the contract awarded to the foreign supplier, but just order it 
recompeted, or just give the foreign supplier its bid preparation 
costs. Victories of any degree may well be isolated and not readily 
replicated. A single victory on one contract for one foreign supplier 
does not end the battle in all states, or even in that state. The path 
for foreign suppliers may appear long, hard, and uphill. 
In sum, the states do not face any need to expect vigorous for-
eign campaigns to flatten their in-state preferences. More because 
of the cumbersome procedures and remedial limitations than any-
thing else, state legislatures that wish to continue existing formal or 
informal in-state preferences, or to create new ones, can do so, and 
state administrations that choose to apply formal or informal prefer-
ences against GATT signatories, if they use some subtlety and have 
some decent fortune in their own state courts, may find they often 
succeed in doing so. For these reasons, where the political forces in 
a particular state, at a particular time, strongly oppose admitting se-
rious foreign competition in particular state procurement sectors, 
the AGP may not prevent those forces from having their way. 
N. VIEWING THE AGP'S LIMITED EFFECT AS POLITICALLY 
VALUABLE 
A free trade supporter who accepted the foregoing analysis as 
correct in predicting that local "protectionists" can still have their 
way might regard this as purely bad news. In economic terms, the 
usually prefer to defend the agency action on those stated grounds. The natu-
ral temptation for the state court is to decide the validity of the agency action 
on its stated terms and the terms of the defending state executive lawyer, not 
on seemingly exotic grounds about how the state, although it bound itself to 
the AGP, cannot be asked whether it is obeying the AGP. Who can say what is 
the status, in state law, of the state governor's action in consenting for that 
state's inclusion in the AGP annex? 
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free trade analyst points out that such protection simply means the 
people of that state hurt themselves, by paying more to buy what 
their tax dollars could more reasonably buy from out~f-state suppli-
ers. Moreover, to the extent that a still-somewhat-closed United 
States market comes to the attention of the world, that encourages 
"protectionist" forces abroad to insist on having their way too. This 
would rebound against the United States' interests in free trade 
overseas. 
I submit that the AGP's remedy limitations serve valuable politi-
cal purposes. In domestic terms, those limitations maintain the po-
litical flexibility inherent in the dual sovereignty system of American 
federalism. An appropriate point from which to analyze the special 
federalism aspects of state procurement would be the Supreme 
Court's decisions not to apply Commerce Clause principles applica-
ble in other sectors, to the sector of state procurement. The Court 
had long applied the Commerce Clause principle known as the 
"dormant" Commerce Clause to prohibit state government use of 
reglll ':\tnry power to discriminatorily exclude out~f-state businesses 
from equal access to that state's commercial markets. In 1976, the 
Court first enunciated its "market participant" exception to that 
Commerce Clause principle, by which it said a State government, 
acting not as a regulator of that state's commercial market but just 
as a decider of how the state government would handle its own pro-
curement, could "exercis[e] the right to favor its own citizens over 
others."56 
The Court further confirmed the doctrine in 1980, explaining 
two applicable considerations. When a state government buys or 
sells for itself, the Court said, it exercises 
the long-recognized right of trader or manufacturer, en-
gaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his 
own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will 
deal.57 
Moreover, regarding state procurement, "[r]estraint in this area is 
also counseled by considerations of state sovereignty, the role of 
each State 'as guardian and trustee for its people . . . .' "58 
56. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Crop., 426 u.s. 794, 810 (1976). 
57. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438-39 (1980). 
58. [d. at 438; accord White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 
460 U.S. 204, 207 & n.3 (1983). 
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The Court's analysis applies here as a basis for evaluating the 
wisdom of the AGP's remedial limitations, not as a question of the 
boundaries of federal power.59 Simply following the Court's reason-
ing as to policy, it makes sense not to push free trade principles as 
implacably to state procurement than to the commercial market. 
State procurement involves, as the Court said, "considerations of 
state sovereignty," for the state governments derive from the inde-
pendent sources of state constitutions, state tax systems, and state 
elections both their permanent sovereign budget authority and 
their electorally-renewed popular fiscal consent. A free-trade sup-
porter may criticize a state's "in-state" preference in economic 
terms, as a short-sighted or selfish decision. Yet, viewed in federal-
ism terms, leaving state legislatures and state administrations some 
authority to exercise such a preference renders unto the local Cae-
sar the things that are Caesar's: the authority inherent in the Ameri-
can dual-sovereign system for the populace in particular places, at 
particular times, to uses its own money as it wishes. 
Sophisticated commentary about commercial law has long 
noted the importance of remedies, and particularly how under-
remedying amounts to a partial undoing of substantive legal princi-
ples.60 Yet, what Congress and the President have arranged as limita-
tions on AGP remedy do not amount to some loose, accidental, or 
even hypocritical partial undoing of its substantive principles. 
Rather, the implementation law for the AGP has accurately and cal-
culatedly used remedy principles to arrange the provision of flexibil-
ity along political rather than legal lines. Had the implementation 
law allowed aggrieved private foreign suppliers to file suits under 
the AGP in federal courts, the confrontation of free trade principles 
with state sovereignty would have occurred in the forum least able 
to take political factors into account. The cumbersome nature of 
the GATT panel procedure, and the fact that a panel's action does 
not itself invalidate or pre-empt a state law, keeps the flash-point of 
head-on confrontation out of the forums that would most grate on 
59. These "market participant" cases concern the "dormant" Commerce Clause 
context where Congress has not sought to pre-empt state law, and contain no 
discussion regarding a lack of power in Congress to decide to do so (particu-
larly where Congress would exercise its even greater powers on matters affect-
ing foreign commerce than on matters affecting domestic commerce). 
60. See, e.g., John A Sebert, Jr., Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in Actions Based 
Upon Contract: Tuwam Achieving the Objective of FuU Compensation, 33 UClA L 
REv. 1565 (1986). 
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the sensitivities of the population of the state with the in-state or 
"Buy America" viewpoint. 
Instead, two types of filters have been arranged. The challenges 
of foreign nations can only result in a judgment that forcibly over-
comes state recalcitrance only after layers and layers of proceedings 
and consultations, followed by a political decision, likely to be very 
rare, by the Attorney General to file a suit. More likely, efforts by 
aggrieved foreign suppliers on their own can have effect only 
through persuasion of state administrative officials and possibly -
after overcoming the powerful inhibitory factors previously de-
scribed - through actions in some states by those states' own 
courts. 
Moreover, this buffering of particular sensitivities of state popu-
lations has occurred without severe harm to the nation's interest in 
negotiating reciprocal lowering of international trade barriers. The 
United States Trade Representative successfully moved forward with 
the Uruguay Round negotiations without making an offer broader 
than was acceptable to the consenting thirty-seven states. Conversely, 
the other negotiators, particularly from the European Union, simply 
negotiated on the basis that what they would open up to free trade 
in their own economy, should approximately correspond in scale to 
what the United States opened up. In fact, when the Europeans saw 
the American limits on opening, the Europeans cut back their cor-
responding offer, with some of their governmental entities covered 
only as to procurement of goods, not works or services.61 
v. CONCLUSION 
On its surface, the AGP appears to promise as a matter of sub-
stantive principle the opening of American state procurement on 
an equal basis to foreign suppliers. Its substantive coverage rules 
and, more important, the mechanisms of its remedies actually limit 
considerably its effect. In particular, in those states and at those 
times that the population strongly desires to favor its own firms in 
state procurement, the· state government has ways of doing so. Cor-
respondingly, foreign suppliers will find it difficult to engage in any 
kind of across-the-board campaign to pry open all the American 
state markets. 
However this seems as economics, it makes good sense as polit-
ics. When the issues concern sensitive questions of federalism, the 
goals of free trade should not be considered matters of ironclad 
61. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 449. 
50 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 26 
principle. Evolving politics forces and processes, rather than prede-
termined inflexible legal rules, will determine the pace and avenue 
of the opening to the world of the American state procurement 
sector. 
At times this may prove an international embarrassment or an 
economic loss. It may create battle-points in future trade disputes. 
Yet, one of the main benefits of the American dual sovereignty sys-
tem is its array of political mechanisms for adjustments between an 
overall set of national interests and the intense resistance of particu-
lar local populations on particular points. The AGP makes wise use 
of that flexibility to put future conflicts into political channels. 
